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The electric power system is one of the cornerstones of modern society. One of its most serious malfunctions
is the blackout, a catastrophic event that may disrupt a substantial portion of the system, playing havoc
to human life and causing great economic losses. Thus, understanding the mechanisms leading to blackouts
and creating a reliable and resilient power grid has been a major issue, attracting the attention of scientists,
engineers and stakeholders. In this paper, we study the blackout problem in power grids by considering a
practical phase-oscillator model. This model allows one to simultaneously consider different types of power
sources (e.g., traditional AC power plants and renewable power sources connected by DC/AC inverters) and
different types of loads (e.g., consumers connected to distribution networks and consumers directly connected
to power plants). We propose two new control strategies based on our model, one for traditional power grids,
and another one for smart grids. The control strategies show the efficient function of the fast-response energy
storage systems in preventing and predicting blackouts in smart grids. This work provides innovative ideas
which help us to build up a robuster and more economic smart power system.
PACS numbers: Valid PACS appear here
Keywords: Suggested keywords
One of the most serious malfunctions of today’s
electric power grid is the blackout. A blackout
is a phenomenon of cascading failures in power
grids that may disrupt a substantial portion of
power grids, causing large economic losses and
impacting on human life. Due to the complexity
involving in the modelling of the power grid to
understand the basic principles leading to black-
outs and ways to control it, research on this topic
has attracted the attention of not only engineers
but also of scientists. In this paper, we study the
blackout phenomena resulting from the synchro-
nisation collapse in the generators, by consider-
ing a practical phase-oscillator model, which al-
lows one to simultaneously incorporate different
types of power sources and loads. We propose
two smart control strategies, one for traditional
power grids in which the control of a generator
is solely based on its local state, and another one
for smart grids in which a generator is controlled
based on information about the state of other
relevant components of the grids. The control
strategies aim to show the active influence on the
dynamics of smart grids from the fast-response
energy storage systems, which provides an inno-
vative approach to mitigate and predict blackouts
in smart grids and to build up a robuster and
more economic power system.
a)Electronic mail: r01cw13@abdn.ac.uk
I. INTRODUCTION
The electrical infrastructure plays a vital significant
role in the modern society. The blackout, a phenomenon
of cascading failures in power grids, is a comprehensive,
complicated and fast-evolving process caused by differ-
ent reasons1–3. For example, the blackout of the U.S.-
Canadian power grid on 14 August, 2003, interrupted
approximately 63 GW of load and affected about 50
million people in eight U.S. states and two Canadian
provinces3,4. A nationwide blackout happened in Italy
on 28 September, 2003, due to cascading failures caused
by the tripping of the power transmission line between
Italy and Switzerland5,6. On 31 July, 2012, a more se-
vere power blackout caused by a relay problem, affected
22 states of India and left approximate 700 million people
in darkness.7,8
A great deal of attention from both the engineers9–14
and physicists15–20 has recently been drawn to study
blackouts by considering both traditional and smart
grids, aiming at finding the most unifying and funda-
mental reasons for such events. Some works21–23 pro-
posed advanced control strategies to prevent these events.
Yet, despite these efforts, blackouts are still occurring
since power grids are complicated self-organised critical
systems24–26 experiencing inevitable and diverse levels of
disturbances. The adverse influence of a blackout tends
to increase, since the modern power grids are expand-
ing with more interconnections among different areas and
countries27, making the research for blackout more nec-
essary.
The collapse of frequency synchronisation (FS) in
power systems is one of the main causes behind these
catastrophic events. Collapsing FS is mainly caused by
the imbalance of active power between generators and
2loads28,29. In a normal operating state, the active power
generation and consumption must be timely equal re-
gardless of the power loss in the system. Otherwise,
some components of the power grid are tripped due to
overload resulting in a disconnection between these com-
ponents and the main network. A loss of components,
such as generators, aggravates the imbalance of active
power, which may cause a FS collapse.
In this paper, we discuss the blackout scenarios result-
ing from an FS collapse, by considering a practical model.
Comparing to the Kuramoto-like model30 and the swing
equation31, our model allows one to study power grids
by simultaneously considering different types of power
sources and different types of consumers. We put for-
ward two smart control strategies to avoid it. One smart
control strategy is designed for traditional power grids
in which a generator is controlled based on its own state,
and another one is for smart grids based on a communica-
tion network, which is able to timely collect and exchange
information about the state of the network among some
important components of power grids. For the latter
control strategy, the behaviour of the controlled power
system allows us to predict the power energy that the
remaining generators need, to prevent a blackout from
happening due to a major failure caused by one genera-
tor. Our control strategies are based on distributed fast-
response energy storage systems, which grants a posi-
tive motivation for the development of distributed renew-
able energy. Comparing to other works21–23, our control
strategies can not only prevent a blackout from happen-
ing, but also greatly decrease the requirement of backup
power from generators to restore normal functioning of
the power systems. Thus, this work also contributes to-
wards the design and implementation of more resilient
and economic power grids.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a power grid without power loss in the
transmission lines. A reduced power grid can be ob-
tained by the Kron reduction32–34 that eliminates all of
the junction nodes where the input power is equal to the
output power [node 4 in Fig. 1 (a)]. Figure 1 (b) shows
the reduced power grid obtained from the one shown in
Fig. 1 (a), using the Kron reduction method to elimi-
nate node 4. In the reduced network, a load may share
a node with a generator [node 1 in Fig. 1 (b)], or may
occupy a separate node [node 5 in Fig. 1 (b)]. We use
the elements of the index set IGL = {1, · · · , NGL} to
represent the labels for the nodes indicating generators
[node 2 in Fig. 1 (b)] or the nodes shared by a generator
and a load [node 1 in Fig. 1 (b)], the elements of the
index set IDL = {NGL + 1, · · · , N} to denote the labels
for the nodes indicating DC sources (e.g., solar power)
connected by the DC/AC inverters [node 3 in Fig. 1 (b)],
or the nodes indicating loads occupying separate nodes
[node 5 in Fig. 1 (b)], and the elements of the index set
IN = {1, · · · , N} to indicate the labels for all nodes in a
reduced power grid.
(a)
(b)
FIG. 1. (a) The original power grid including 2 generators
(G), 1 DC source (D), 2 loads (L) and 1 junction node (node
4). (b) The reduced power grid obtained using the Kron re-
duction to eliminate the junction node.
The model of the power grid is given by Eqs. (1) and
(2). The generator is modelled by the swing equation31,
namely,


Θ˙i = Ωi, ∀i ∈ IGL,
MiΩ˙i = PG,i + PL,i −
N∑
j=1
bij sinΘij −DiΩi, ∀i ∈ IGL, ∀j ∈ IN ,
(1)
where Θi is the phase angle of node i, Θij = Θi − Θj,
Ωi is the instantaneous angular frequency of generator i,
Mi and Di are the normalised inertia and damping co-
efficient, respectively, PG,i is the mechanical power pro-
vided by turbine i, PL,i is the power consumed by the
load sharing node i and PL,i = 0 if there is no load shar-
ing the node with generator i, bij = |Ui||Uj |ℑYij , where
Ui is the bus voltage of node i, Yij = Yji is a complex
number representing the admittance of the transmission
line between node i and j, Yij = 0 if i and j are not
directly connected in the reduced power grid, and ℑYij
is the imaginary part of Yij .
(iii) A DC source or a load occupying a separate node
is modelled by14,35,
DiΘ˙i = PDL,i −
N∑
j=1
bij sinΘij , ∀i ∈ IDL, ∀j ∈ IN , (2)
where for a DC source, PDL,i > 0 is the nominal power
source, 1/Di is the droop-slope of the droop controller
of the DC/AC inverter; for a load occupying a separate
node, PDL,i < 0 is a constant power load, Di > 0 and
DiΘ˙i is a part of frequency-dependent load.
We apply a rotating frame for the models in Eqs. (1)
and (2) by letting θi = Θi − Ωnt and ωi = Ωi − Ωn,
where Ωn = 2pifn is the natural angular frequency, and
fn=50Hz or 60Hz is the natural frequency of the power
grid. The natural angular frequency becomes ωn = 0 in
3the rotating frame, then Eqs. (1) and (2) become,


θ˙i = TDL,i −
N∑
j=1
aij sin θij , ∀i ∈ IDL, ∀j ∈ IN ,
θ˙i = ωi, ∀i ∈ IGL,
ω˙i = TG,i + TL,i −
N∑
j=1
aij sin θij − Fiωi, ∀i ∈ IGL, ∀j ∈ IN ,
(3)
where θij = θi−θj ; if i ∈ IDL, TDL,i =
PDL,i
Di
−Ωn, aij =
bij
Di
; if i ∈ IGL, TG,i =
PG,i
Mi
, TL,i =
1
Mi
(PL,i − DiΩn),
aij =
bij
Mi
, Fi =
Di
Mi
.
Equation (3) describes a power grid of a coupled phase-
oscillator network which contains both traditional AC
power plants and renewable power sources connected by
DC/AC converters, and includes both users connected
to distribution networks and consumers powered directly
by power plants. A steady state of the power grid corre-
sponds to a FS state of Eq. (3), defined by θ˙i = ωi = 0.
Summing the first and third equations, which are related
to power transmission in Eq. (3) for all i, we have
∑
i∈IGL
ω˙i +
∑
i∈IDL
θ˙i
=
∑
i∈IGL
TG,i +
∑
i∈IGL
TL,i +
∑
i∈IDL
TDL,i −
∑
i∈IGL
Fiωi.
(4)
In a steady state, the power system operates at an equi-
librium point, and all nodes are in frequency synchroni-
sation with θ˙eqi = ω
eq
i = ωn = 0, implying the “imbalance
power” between generators and loads to be zero, namely,
dT =
∑
i∈IGL
TG,i +
∑
i∈IGL
TL,i +
∑
i∈IDL
TDL,i = 0. (5)
This means that the power produced by generators is
equal to that consumed by loads in a steady state.
Blackout process- Assume that at t = t0 there is a loss
of a high-capacity generator with label m ∈ IGL, i.e.,
TG,m suddenly becomes 0 from a large positive value,
such that dT < 0. The stored kinetic energy in the rotors
of all remaining generators are then released to balance
the power between generators and consumers, resulting
in the deceleration of the speed of rotors, i.e., a drop of
the angular frequencies ωi from 0. In order to maintain
the stability of the system, the remaining generators need
to provide additional power, such that dT returns to 0
and all ωi also returns to 0. The power system then
reaches a new steady state. The regulation process of
the output power in a generator can be controlled by its
active power regulating system, which is described by,
T˙G,i = −Kiωi, ∀i ∈ IGL, (6)
where Ki > 0 is the regulation constant of generator i
that can be manually set, and ωi indicates the frequency
deviation from 0 for node i in the dynamic process.
Equation (6) can represent either the turbine governor
system or the energy storage system in power grids. The
mechanism of this control is that when dT < 0 (> 0),
the angular speed of the generator rotors, ωi decreases
(increases) due to the release (accumulation) of kinetic
energy in the rotors. This leads to a negative (positive)
ωi, which, according to Eq. (6), forces TG,i to increase
(decrease) by automatically turning up (down) the flow
rate of steam into the turbine. Thus, more (less) en-
ergy is provided by prime movers. The adjusting power
from prime movers accelerates (decelerates) the rotors to
balance the generation power and consumption power.
Finally, ωi returns to 0, dT becomes 0 as well, and the
whole system reaches a new steady state. By providing
such a negative feedback to the system, this control en-
hances the stability of the system around its equilibrium
point. Traditionally, the turbine governor system needs
long time to adjust the flow rate of steam due to the
mechanical inertia of machines. However, some new en-
ergy storage systems are developed nowadays36,37, such
as large battery arrays, solar farms and the storage sys-
tems in wind farms, to provide faster response to the fre-
quency change and quickly provide supplementary power
into the system to help it to reach a new steady state. In
this paper, we assume all the energy storage systems in
power plants are fast-response systems.
When the system loses generator m, the angular fre-
quencies of the remaining generators fluctuate, and these
generators provide supplementary power according to
Eq. (6) in order to mitigate the frequency fluctuation.
Let TmaxG,i and T
min
G,i be the upper and lower physical
bounds of TG,i. During the dynamic process, if TG,i >
TmaxG,i (overload) or TG,i < T
min
G,i , generator i is tripped by
its protection devices, resulting in a disconnection of an
additional generator. A loss of one more generator results
in larger disturbance of the whole system and more power
requirement from other generators. This leads more gen-
erators to be tripped due to overload. Such a cascading
failure may lead to a FS collapse, resulting in a blackout
in the power grid, i.e., the loss of all generators. The
backup-power capacity of generator i is defined by
Tb,i = T
max
G,i − T
eq
G,i. (7)
We define the power ratio, ηi, to indicate the ratio be-
tween the power supplemented by generator i and its
output power in the steady state before t0 by
ηi =
TG,i − T
eq
G,i
T eqG,i
. (8)
Let
ηmaxi =
TmaxG,i − T
eq
G,i
T eqG,i
=
Tb,i
T eqG,i
> 0 (9)
and
ηmini =
TminG,i − T
eq
G,i
T eqG,i
6 0 (10)
represent the maximum and minimum values that ηi can
assume, respectively. We simply set ηmini = −0.5 (i.e,
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Simulation for the IEEE 39 bus system.
(a) and (b) show the changes of the power ratio, ηi, and the
angular frequency, ωi, respectively, with η
max
i = 2; (c) and (d)
show the changes of ηi and ωi, respectively, with η
max
i = 1.5;
(e) and (f) show the changes of ηi and ωi, respectively, with
ηmaxi = 0.8.
TminG,i = 0.5T
eq
G,i), ∀i ∈ IGL, because we focus on the
overload problem in this paper and ηmini does not af-
fect our numerical experiments. We use the IEEE 39
bus system to show how blackout happens and how ηmaxi
affects the behaviour of the system. The IEEE 39 bus
system, also known as the New-England Power System,
includes 10 generators, 2 loads sharing nodes with gen-
erators, 17 loads occupying separate nodes, and 12 junc-
tion nodes. Appendix A provides the topology and the
data required in numerical experiments for this system.
By Kron reduction32–34, we eliminate the junction nodes
and obtain a system with 27 nodes. In our numerical ex-
periments, we neglect the influence of the voltage change,
such that all coupling strengths (aij) remain unchanged.
We initiate the dynamic process by switching off gener-
ator 1 which has the maximum capacity at t=20s, i.e.,
forcing TG,1 = 0 at t = 20s. We plot the changes of ηi
and ωi for the remaining generators. We set TG,i = 0 and
ηi = 0 if generator i is tripped due to overload in the ex-
periments. Figures 2 (a) and 2 (b) show the results with
a large ηmaxi = 2.0, ∀i ∈ IGL. Every generator supple-
ments some power from t = 20s and no remaining ones
are tripped [Fig. 2 (a)]. The angular frequency of each
generator, ωi, experiences fluctuation from t = 20s, but
finally returns to 0 [Fig. 2 (b)], meaning that the system
reaches a new steady state. Figures 2 (c) and 2 (d) show
simulations considering ηmaxi = 1.5, ∀i ∈ IGL. Figure 2
(c) indicates that generator 10 is tripped at t = 20.779s
due to overload, but other generators successfully pro-
vides enough power to the system. Thus, the system
reaches a new steady state, i.e., the angular frequencies
of the remaining generators finally become 0, as shown
in Fig. 2 (b). Figures 2 (e) and 2 (f) show the result with
ηmaxi = 0.8, ∀i ∈ IGL. As shown in Fig. 2 (e), the gen-
erators are tripped one by one due to overload. Finally,
at t = 22.693s, the system lose all generators and a FS
collapse occurs [Fig. 2 (f)].
III. SMART CONTROL
A. Smart control I
As shown in Figs. 2 (c) and 2 (e), when a generator is
tripped due to overload, the ηi of the remaining genera-
tors are still far away from the maximum limit, mean-
ing that the remaining generators still possesses large
amounts of backup power that can be used to restore the
stability of the power grid. In order to efficiently use the
backup power of every generator to avoid a blackout, we
develop a smart control, which will greatly improve the
robustness of power grids with less requirement of backup
power for generators. For that, we change Eq. (6) into
T˙G,i = −αiKiωi, ∀i ∈ IGL, (11)
where αi = (T
max
G,i − TG,i)/(T
max
G,i − T
eq
G,i) if ωi 6 0,
and αi = (TG,i − T
min
G,i )/(T
eq
G,i − T
min
G,i ) if ωi > 0. At
a steady state, TG,i = T
eq
G,i, we have α = 1; when gen-
erator i reaches its output limits, we have TG,i = T
max
G,i
or TG,i = T
min
G,i resulting in αi = 0. Thus, TG,i does not
change any more when it reaches its limits, and none of
the generators are then tripped due to overload.
The utilisation ratio of the backup-power capacity of
generator i is defined by
σi% =
TG,i − T
eq
G,i
Tb,i
(12)
Figure 3 and Tab. I show the numerical results
for the IEEE 39 bus system with smart control I.
Set ηmaxi = 0.2, ∀i ∈ IGL, which is smaller than
ηmaxi = 0.8, ∀i ∈ IGL that was used in Figs. 2
(e) and 2 (f) where a blackout happens without the
implementation of smart control I. A smaller ηmaxi
indicates a smaller backup-power capacity of generator
i. At t = 20s we lose generator 1. With our control
strategy, none of the remaining generators is tripped,
although some of them have almost provided their full
backup-power capacity (some σi% ≈ 100% in Tab. I),
and the angular frequencies of all remaining generators
return to 0 after some fluctuations [Fig. 3 (b)]. This
means that, by applying the smart control I, we avoid a
blackout in the system with less backup-power capacity
requirement for generators. Less backup-power capacity
requirement greatly improves the economic side of power
systems.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Results for the IEEE 39 bus system
with smart control I. (a) and (b) show the changes of the
power ratio, ηi, and the angular frequency, ωi, respectively,
with ηmaxi = 0.2.
TABLE I. Utilisation ratio of backup power of generators with
smart control I
i 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
σi% 87.9 91.4 94.9 99.7 99.8 99.6 99.8 96.7 99.7
B. Smart control II
The smart control I is easily implemented because ωi
and αi can be locally measured or calculated for every
generator. However, the drawback of the smart control
I is that some of the generators nearly reach their maxi-
mum output limits (some σi% ≈ 100% in Tab. I), reserv-
ing no extra power for engineers to impose any further
manual control with these generators and leaving these
generators at a dangerous critical state. Next, we propose
an improved smart control based on smart grid technol-
ogy to tackle this problem. With the fast development
of smart grids, it becomes possible to timely measure
and exchange the information (e.g., ωi) among different
nodes in a power network by a separate network layer –
the communication network14,38. To utilise the commu-
nication network, we change Eq. (6) into
T˙G,i = −βiKiω, (13)
where βi = Tb,i/T
max
b with T
max
b := max{Tb,i|i ∈ IGL}
indicating the maximum backup-power capacity among
all generators, and ω =
∑N
i=1 γiωi/
∑N
i=1 γi with γi indi-
cating the importance level of node i. We set γi = 1 if
node i is a generator, a large capacity DC source or an
important load which is sensitive to frequency change,
and γi = 0 if the information of node i is unavailable or
node i is not important (e.g., a normal load).
Smart control II improves the control performance
by introducing the average angular frequency, ω, which
embodies a teamwork principle, i.e., one generator lost,
all the remaining generators supplement required power
together, according to the change of the average angular
frequency of some important nodes instead of according
to their local angular frequencies. Furthermore, the
new variable, βi, prompts generator i to provide power
based on its backup-power capacity, Tb,i. In other
words, a generator with a larger backup-power capacity
contributes more power to the power grid than the one
with a smaller capacity. This is also an improvement
compared to the smart control I in which the variable αi
just limits the maximum output of generator i to ensure
its non-overload.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Simulation for the IEEE 39 bus system
with the smart control II. (a) shows the change of the power
ratio, ηi, by the main plot and the angular frequency, ωi by
the sub-plot with ηmaxi = 0.2, ∀i ∈ IGL; (b) shows the
changes of ηi (main plot) and ωi (sub-plot) with η
max
i varying
from 0.17 to 0.25.
TABLE II. Utilisation ratio of backup power of generators
with smart control II
i 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ηmaxi 0.20
σi% 97.7 97.4 97.3 97.3 97.4 97.3 97.4 97.4 97.3
ηmaxi 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25
σi% 91.2 90.9 90.8 90.8 90.9 90.8 90.9 90.9 90.8
Figure 4 and Tab. II demonstrates the effectiveness of
smart control II. At t = 20s, we lose generator 1. Fig-
ure 4 (a) shows the results with ηmaxi = 0.2, ∀i ∈ IGL.
The nine lines indicating ηi for the nine remaining gen-
erators in Fig. 4 (a) merges into one and σi% ≈ 97% for
i = 2, · · · , 10, as shown in Tab. II, meaning that all gen-
erators supplement power with the same ratio to their
back-up power capacities. Finally, none of the remain-
ing generators reaches their full output limits, and the
frequencies finally return to 0 as shown in the sub-plot
in Fig. 4 (a). In real power systems, ηmaxi is not strictly
equal to ηmaxj for i 6= j. Figure 4 (b) shows the re-
sult for a more realistic case where ηmaxi varies from 0.17
to 0.25 (shown in Tab. II). In this case, σi% ≈ 91%
for i = 2, · · · , 10 (shown in Tab. II), meaning that all
remaining generators still provide power with the same
proportion to their own backup-power capacities, even
though ηmaxi is different. Our numerical experiments in-
dicate that smart control II not only avoids a blackout,
but also prevents some generators from reaching their
critical points, which greatly improves the stability and
robustness of the IEEE 39 bus system.
By comparing Fig. 2 (a) and Fig. 4, we conclude that
smart control II (FIG. 4) restrains oscillations on the
6curves of η. This means that, with the implementation
of the smart control II, the remaining generators do not
need to provide more power in the dynamic process than
that required in the final steady state of the power sys-
tem. Thus, the back-up power capacity of generators can
be decreased by implementing the smart control II, which
greatly increases the economic side of power systems.
IV. PREDICTING BLACKOUTS
Assume that the generator m with capacity Tm is lost.
Smart control I and II enable the remaining generators
to provide their full back-up power capacities. As a con-
sequence, we can predict that a blackout happens if the
total back-up power
∑
i6=m Tb,i cannot match the lost ca-
pacity, i.e., if
∑
i6=m Tb,i < Tm. Furthermore, smart con-
trol II allows the remaining generators to provide power
with nearly the same ratio (σ% = σi% ≈ σj%, for i 6= j)
as their back-up power capacities, Tb,i. This means that
Tm =
∑
i6=m σi%Tb,i ≈ σ%
∑
i6=m Tb,i, i.e, the utilisation
ratio of the back-up power capacity for every remaining
generator can be approximately obtained by
σ% ≈
Tm∑
i6=m Tb,i
. (14)
Thus, we can predict, without numerical simulation, how
much power is finally provided by each remaining gener-
ator by changing Eq. (12) to
TG,i = σ%Tb,i + T
eq
G,i, (15)
where Tb,i can be calculated from Eq. (9) with known
ηmaxi and T
eq
G,i.
Define the relative error between the predicted and
the numerical obtained values of TG,i by δi = |(T
′
G,i −
TG,i)/TG,i|, where T
′
G,i indicates the predicted value
of TG,i from Eq. (15). We carry out two numeri-
cal simulations similar to the previous ones. We set
ηmaxi = 0.2, ∀i ∈ IGL for one case, and set η
max
i vary-
ing from 0.17 to 0.25 for another case. At t = 20s,
we lose generator 1. We record the numerical out-
put power of the remaining generators after the sys-
tem is restored. Table III demonstrates the values
of δi in the simulations. All the values of δi are
small, which means that our prediction is effective.
TABLE III. The relative errors between the predicted and
numerical values of TG,i with smart control II
i 10 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
ηmaxi 0.20
δi/10
−4 5.4 0.3 1.3 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.3 0.3 1.3
ηmaxi 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25
δi/10
−4 4.8 0.4 1.1 1.2 0.5 1.3 0.5 0.5 1.5
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the mechanism that cre-
ates blackouts in a realistic model for the power grid due
to a loss of synchronisation among the generators. Based
on this study, we provided two smart control strategies
which requires less backup power for the generators to
avoid the onset of a blackout. One of the smart con-
trol strategies was used for the traditional power sys-
tems, in which the control of a generator is only based
on its own state; the other control was designed for the
smart grids, in which the control of a generator consid-
ers the state of other generators. For the latter control
strategy, the behaviour of the controlled power system al-
lowed us to predict the power energy that the remaining
generators needed, to prevent a blackout from happen-
ing due to a major failure caused by one generator. Our
control strategies demonstrate the active influence of the
distributed fast-response storage systems in smart grids.
We considered the IEEE 39 bus system as a practi-
cal topology for simulations, instead of an abstract topo-
logical model of the power grids, such as small world
networks or random networks. However, our control
methods were applied to the fast-response energy stor-
age systems in power plants, regardless of the topology
of the network. Thus we can safely conclude that they
are robust for power grids with arbitrary topology. Our
work contributes for the understanding of power grids
by studying a more practical model, also helps engineers
to improve the robustness and economic aspect of power
grids.
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Appendix A: Appendixes
The topology of the IEEE 39 bus system is shown by
Fig. 5. We treat every bus as a node, thus, there are
39 nodes in this system including 10 generators, 17 con-
sumers occupying separated nodes, 2 consumers sharing
nodes with generators (bus 31 and 39), 12 junction nodes.
This power grid can be reduced to a 27 node network by
eliminating the 12 junction nodes through Kron reduc-
tion. In our analysis, we use N0 = 39 and N = 27 to
represent the total number of nodes in the original net-
work and in the reduced network, respectively.
Tables IV and V give the data for buses and trans-
mission lines, respectively. Reference39 provides a power
flow study result for the IEEE 39 bus system, which con-
tains all the original data, except for the damping co-
efficient D and the control parameter K, for our nu-
merical experiments. We set Di = 2, ∀i ∈ IGL,
7FIG. 5. Diagram of the IEEE 39 bus system. Image obtained
from Ref.39.
Di = 3, ∀i ∈ IDL, Let Ki = 1, ∀i ∈ IGL for the
numerical experiments without smart control strategy
(SCS) and with SCS I, and Ki = 0.01, ∀i ∈ IGL
for the numerical experiments with SCS II, since gen-
erators become more sensitive to the frequency change
with SCS II and the numerical experiments cannot get
a convergent result with K = 1. The normalised in-
ertia can be calculated by Mi =
2Hi
Ωn
= 2Hi2pifn , where
fn =50Hz or 60Hz is the natural frequency of power
systems. P 0G and P
0
L are obtained from the power flow
results in Ref.39 by considering with power loss in trans-
mission lines, resulting in
∑NG
i=1 P
0
G,i +
∑N
i=NG+1
P 0L,i =
43.71 6= 0, where 43.71 indicates the total power loss
in transmission lines. In order to construct a reduced
network (27 nodes) without power loss in transmission
line, we let PG,i = P
0
G,i − P and PL,i = P
0
L,i − P , where
P = 1
N
(∑NG
i=1 P
0
G,i +
∑N
i=NG+1
P 0L,i
)
= 43.1727 ≈ 1.6189.
This means that the 27 nodes in the reduced network
share equally the power loss in transmission lines, such
that
∑NG
i=1 PG,i +
∑N
i=NG+1
PL,i = 0, indicating that the
power provided by generators are equal to that consumed
by consumers.
We neglect the reactances of all generators and the
transformer tapping when we calculate the coupling
strengths, although they are provided in Ref.39, because
this neglect dose not affect the results of our numeri-
cal experiments, but greatly simplifies the experiments.
Thus, the coupling strengths can be calculated by the fol-
lowing steps: (i), using the data in Tab. IV to calculate
the admittance matrix Y, where Ypq = Yqp = −
1
Rpq+iXqp
if p 6= q, and Ypp = −
∑N0
q=1 Ypq +
1
2 iBpq; (ii) using U
in Tab. V to calculate bpq by bpq = |Up||Uq|ℑYpq where
ℑYpq is the imaginary part of Ypq.
TABLE IV. Transmission line data. Data from Ref.39.
From Bus To Bus R X B
1 2 0.0035 0.0411 0.6987
1 39 0.0010 0.0250 0.7500
2 3 0.0013 0.0151 0.2572
2 25 0.0070 0.0086 0.1460
3 4 0.0013 0.0213 0.2214
3 18 0.0011 0.0133 0.2138
4 5 0.0008 0.0128 0.1342
4 14 0.0008 0.0129 0.1382
5 6 0.0002 0.0026 0.0434
5 8 0.0008 0.0112 0.1476
6 7 0.0006 0.0092 0.1130
6 11 0.0007 0.0082 0.1389
7 8 0.0004 0.0046 0.0780
8 9 0.0023 0.0363 0.3804
9 39 0.0010 0.0250 1.2000
10 11 0.0004 0.0043 0.0729
10 13 0.0004 0.0043 0.0729
13 14 0.0009 0.0101 0.1723
14 15 0.0018 0.0217 0.3660
15 16 0.0009 0.0094 0.1710
16 17 0.0007 0.0089 0.1342
16 19 0.0016 0.0195 0.3040
16 21 0.0008 0.0135 0.2548
16 24 0.0003 0.0059 0.0680
17 18 0.0007 0.0082 0.1319
17 27 0.0013 0.0173 0.3216
21 22 0.0008 0.0140 0.2565
22 23 0.0006 0.0096 0.1846
23 24 0.0022 0.0350 0.3610
25 26 0.0032 0.0323 0.5130
26 27 0.0014 0.0147 0.2396
26 28 0.0043 0.0474 0.7802
26 29 0.0057 0.0625 1.0290
28 29 0.0014 0.0151 0.2490
12 11 0.0016 0.0435 0.0000
12 13 0.0016 0.0435 0.0000
6 31 0.0000 0.0250 0.0000
10 32 0.0000 0.0200 0.0000
19 33 0.0007 0.0142 0.0000
20 34 0.0009 0.0180 0.0000
22 35 0.0000 0.0143 0.0000
23 36 0.0005 0.0272 0.0000
25 37 0.0006 0.0232 0.0000
2 30 0.0000 0.0181 0.0000
29 38 0.0008 0.0156 0.0000
19 20 0.0007 0.0138 0.0000
8TABLE V. Bus data. Data from Ref.39.
Bus No. U D P 0L PL P
0
G PG Gen. No. H
1 1.0474 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
2 1.0487 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
3 1.0302 3 -322.00 -323.62 0.00 0.00 - -
4 1.0039 3 -500.00 -501.62 0.00 0.00 - -
5 1.0053 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
6 1.0077 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
7 0.9970 3 -233.80 -235.42 0.00 0.00 - -
8 0.9960 3 -522.00 -523.62 0.00 0.00 - -
9 1.0282 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
10 1.0172 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
11 1.0127 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
12 1.0002 3 -7.50 -9.12 0.00 0.00 - -
13 1.0143 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
14 1.0117 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
15 1.0154 3 -320.00 -321.62 0.00 0.00 - -
16 1.0318 3 -329.00 -330.62 0.00 0.00 - -
17 1.0336 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
18 1.0309 3 -158.00 -159.62 0.00 0.00 - -
19 1.0499 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
20 0.9912 3 -628.00 -629.62 0.00 0.00 - -
21 1.0318 3 -274.00 -275.62 0.00 0.00 - -
22 1.0498 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
23 1.0448 3 -247.50 -249.12 0.00 0.00 - -
24 1.0373 3 -308.60 -310.22 0.00 0.00 - -
25 1.0576 3 -224.00 -225.62 0.00 0.00 - -
26 1.0521 3 -139.00 -140.62 0.00 0.00 - -
27 1.0377 3 -281.00 -282.62 0.00 0.00 - -
28 1.0501 3 -206.00 -207.62 0.00 0.00 - -
29 1.0499 3 -283.50 -285.12 0.00 0.00 - -
30 1.0475 2 0.00 0.00 250.00 248.38 10 500
31 0.9820 2 -9.20 -10.82 520.81 519.19 2 30.3
32 0.9831 2 0.00 0.00 650.00 648.38 3 35.8
33 0.9972 2 0.00 0.00 632.00 630.38 4 28.6
34 1.0123 2 0.00 0.00 508.00 506.38 5 26.0
35 1.0493 2 0.00 0.00 650.00 648.38 6 34.8
36 1.0635 2 0.00 0.00 560.00 558.38 7 26.4
37 1.0278 2 0.00 0.00 540.00 538.38 8 24.3
38 1.0265 2 0.00 0.00 830.00 828.38 9 34.5
39 1.0300 2 -1104.00 -1105.62 1000.00 998.38 1 42.0
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